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I. INTRODUCTION
What is property for? For many, maybe most American lawyers,
the question is virtually self-answering. Property has and, at least in
our society, always has had one core purpose, one constant meaning:
to define in material terms the legal and political sphere within which
individuals are free to satisfy their own preferences, free from governmental coercion or other forms of external interference. Property is
© Copyright held by the NEBFASKA
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the foundation for the categorical separation of the realms of the private and public, individual and collectivity, the market and the polity.
The economic expression of this preference-satisfying conception of
property is commodity. Property satisfies individual preferences most
effectively through the process of market exchange, or what lawyers
call market alienation. The exchange aspect of property is so important in American society that many Americans are apt to view "property" as synonymous with "commodity."
It wasn't always so. As the dominant way of understanding property, the commodity conception is, in fact, a relative latecomer in
American legal thought. What preceded it was an understanding that
I will call "property-as-propriety." The core of this conception is the
idea that property is the material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper social order, the private basis for the public good.
The proprietarian tradition, whose roots can be traced back to Aristotle, takes seriously the idea that the common good can be defined in
substantive terms. That is, it presumes that not all forms of social
order are normatively equal but that some are morally superior to
others.
Just what the proper social order is has been an enormously controversial issue throughout American history. The existence of different substantive conceptions of the proper social order means that
there have been multiple, sometimes contradictory versions of the
proprietarian conception of property in American thought. The Puritans' "Shining City on a Hill," for example, was quite unlike the quasifeudal social order described in antebellum Southern texts defending
slavery, yet both were proprietarian. More strikingly, the recent communitarian movement is based on the same proprietarian premise
that was the intellectual foundation for the Southern slave system, a
social order that modern communitarians otherwise abhor.
What all of these different versions of proprietarian thought share
is a commitment to the basic idea that the market order is not necessarily the proper social order. Proprietarians do not understand the
public good to be whatever social order emerges from the spontaneous
working of the market. They regard the market as a realm in which
individuals are too vulnerable to the temptation to act out of narrow
self-interest rather than, as proprietarian principles require, for the
purpose of maintaining the good of the entire community.
This is not to say that the proprietarian tradition is fundamentally
anti-market. Many versions of proprietarian thought sought to reconcile propriety with the existence of the market. Indeed, in some instances, social propriety was used as the basis for treating as a
commodity "assets" that our society regards as utterly non-commodifiable on moral grounds. The legal defense of slavery in the antebellum
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South again furnishes an example.' What characterizes proprietarian
thought is commitment to a normative conception of the social good
that is prior to the market. Proprietarian regimes are not necessarily
non-market regimes, but neither are they laissez-faire regimes. The
commitment to propriety requires that the market, to the extent that
it is deemed to conflict with or to threaten the social good, be
subordinated to the latter. The proprietarian tradition rejected the
presumption that the scope of the market should be unlimited, and it
did not resort to the familiar market-failure problems of monopoly or
externalities to justify collective restrictions on market freedom.
The idea that the central purpose of private property is to protect
the proper public order rings oddly in modern ears. We are so used to
thinking of property as market commodity that it seems difficult to
imagine that property might be intended to benefit anyone other than
the owner. We are limited not only by the pervasiveness of market
exchange in virtually every sector of modern life but also by the fact
that the very notion of the public good seems anachronistic to modern
sensibilities. Establishing that property-as-propriety was a prominent idea of American legal thought is one objective of this Paper.
Two historical examples, one from our quite recent past, the other
more distant, will illustrate the influence of this conception of property. The idea of property-as-propriety sheds new light on these historical episodes of doctrinal development.
Moving from past to present, this Paper has another objective. The
second objective is to establish the continued influence of the
proprietarian conception in current legal thought and legal doctrine.
That conception certainly is no longer the dominant one, but it is present nevertheless.
II. PROPRIETY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE VESTED
RIGHTS DOCTRINE
One of the stock historical stories about the development of American judicial doctrines concerning property during the nineteenth century is the shift from a "vested rights" conception of property to a
"dynamic" conception. 2 Indeed, virtually the entire story about judicial protection of property interests from legislative regulation
1. The writings by the Southern legal theorist, Thomas R.R. Cobb, are exemplary
here. See, e.g., THoA~s R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AIERICA: TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN HISTORICAL SKETCH
OF SLAVERY (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1858).

2. Exemplars of this interpretation are KEPwr L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 114-19 (1989), and JAizs WLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES

(1956).
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throughout the nineteenth century seems to be the cyclical rise and
fall of the so-called vested rights doctrine. James Willard Hurst expressed the now-standard theme with his customary succinctness
when he stated, "We identify no legal development more sharply with
'
the nineteenth century than the judicial protection of 'vested rights. "'
Boiled down to its basic outline, the story goes as follows. Implemented by the contract clause of the federal Constitution during the
first half of the nineteenth century, the vested rights doctrine at first
protected the first wave of American entrepreneurs. These men (for
they were all men) invested, with active government encouragement,
in enterprises that fueled the nation's economic expansion. Later, as
investment in public utilities like bridges, roads, and canals became
more potentially profitable and attracted increasing amounts of private capital, courts shifted course, overriding vested rights where they
conflicted with the interests of new entrants in enterpreneurial enterprises. Courts sacrificed holders of stable forms of property to protect
investors in dynamic forms of property.
In the second half of the century, the story continues, courts reverted back to a strongly pro-vested rights position in order to protect
entrepreneurs whose interests by now were well established. The constitutional tool for effecting this second incarnation of the vested
rights doctrine was the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted after the Civil War. The key to understanding this
phase of the doctrine, like the first, we are told, is a judicial desire to
protect particular economic interest groups.
In contrast with this version of the story, I will argue that the
emergence and decline of judicial protection for vested rights in the
antebellum period reflected a dialectic between two strands of pro-entrepreneurial discourse. One was the discourse of old Federalists like
Chief Justice John Marshall and their neo-Federalist heirs such as
Joseph Story. These men supported legal protection of entrepreneurial activity that legislatures created by granting to private
investors monopoly privileges for the construction of roads, canals,
bridges, and other public improvements. Federalist-Whigs welcomed
entrepreneurial activity of this sort for political as much as for economic reasons: it was, in their view, conducive to preserving the
proper political order against the rising threat of popular democracy.
To emphasize the fact that it was not hostile to entrepreneurialism as
such, this Federalist-Whig discourse is more accurately termed "entrepreneurial republicanism."4 Standing on the other side were Jacksonian supporters of entrepreneurial activity. The most notable
judicial figure in this group was Marshall's replacement as Chief Jus3. HURsT, supra note 2, at 23.
4. See CHARLES SELLERS, THE MAiKr REvoLUTIoN: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 18151846, at 59 (1991).
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lice, Roger Taney. These men, whom I will call democratic entrepreneurs, spoke the language of equal entrepreneurial opportunity. They
opposed legal protection of existing monopolistic property interests as
both anti-development and undemocratic.
For all of their differences, these two groups shared two basic beliefs. Most conspicuous was their unequivocal embrace of entrepreneurial activity. Both sides favored rapid national development
and population growth in the country's unsettled areas. They
dreamed the same dream of unlimited economic growth and of improvements in the nation's transportation and communication systems that would enable that growth. Even Andrew Jackson himself,
for all of his Jeffersonian talk about "independent farmers [as] the basis of society and the true friends of liberty,"5 was no unambiguous
enemy of economic development. The policies for which his Presidency is best known-opposition to the Second National Bank, the circulation of paper money, and most government aid to internal
improvements-grew out of opposition to unequal privileges and the
loss of personal liberty, not to economic progress as such. 6 Beyond
Jackson and the few remaining true believers in the old Jeffersonian
vision of the agrarian republic, most Americans were bitten by the bug
of acquisitiveness. 7 Looking around at his society, Francis Lieber saw
an "anxiety to be equal to the wealthiest," but few of his contemporaries would have agreed with his Marx-like diagnosis of that condition
as "diseased," or one that would lead to an "appalling frequency of
alienation of mind."8
Entrepreneurialism, however, had ambiguous implications for the
legal protection of property. Promoting entrepreneurial activity might
mean protecting existing interests and maintaining the extant hierarchy of power. It was plausible to think this way insofar as the existing
economic interests were the very source of the market revolution that
had transformed American culture and society. To destabilize those
interests was to threaten the institution of private property, upon
which entrepreneurial activity and economic growth utterly depended.
This was essentially the argument that was the basis of the vested
rights doctrine. Extant property rights, once they had vested, had to
maintain their positions of power until they could no longer serve
their appropriate function.
5. Andrew Jackson, Fourth Annual Message, Dec. 4, 1832, quoted in HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JAcKsONIUAN AMERICA 133 (1990).
6. See MARvIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIkAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 101-41
(1957); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN

AERICA 132-71 (1990).
7. See 1 FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN AMERICA 68-69 (London, Richard Bentley

1835).
8. 2 id. at 29-30.
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That interpretation, though plausible, was not inevitable. There
was another interpretation, at least equally plausible to the first, that
was available to Americans at the time. Drawing on Adam Smith's
unambiguous attack on monopolies a half century earlier,9 one could
conclude that the cause of entrepreneurial activity was best advanced
by exposing established economic interests to competition. Protecting
vested property interests against new entrants in a given enterprise
was tantamount to maintaining a monopoly, which would rapidly
choke economic growth. Stated in the terms just described, the debate
between these two views appears to boil down to the well-known debate in economic theory between pre-classical and classical economists
like Smith and Ricardo.O Alternatively, the debate can be distilled to
a clash between established and rising economic interest groups. 1 1
Without denying that both of these interpretations have some plausibility, I want to augment them with an account that stresses their
relationship to the conflict between the political theories of FederalistWhigs and Jacksonians. That conflict provides the basis for a second
common denominator of entrepreneurial republicans and democratic
entrepreneurs.
That common denominator was an understanding of property as
serving a social-political function as well as the strictly economic function of increasing wealth. What divided entrepreneurial republicans
and democratic entrepreneurs was the identity of that social-political
function. For entrepreneurial republicans (Federalist-Whigs), the vision was of property as the basis for a properly-ordered society headed
by a natural elite of property owners. For democratic entrepreneurs
(Jacksonians), property was linked with democracy, equal opportunities, and the end of old privileges. These two interpretations indicate
that the rise and fall of the antebellum vested rights doctrine, culminating in the great Charles River Bridge case, 12 was not simply a
clash of economic interests but a clash between two interpretations of
what the emergence of an entrepreneurial society meant for the political and social order. They also indicate that although entrepreneurialism thoroughly informed the ways in which legal elites thought
about property by 1850, the modem commodified understanding was
not yet firmly rooted in American legal consciousness by that date.

9. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 471 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1775).
10. See MORTON J. HOmWTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at

110-11 (1977).
11. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES
RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).

12. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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Vested Rights as Proper Order. Fletcher v. Peck

The vested rights doctrine, implemented through the contract
clause of the federal Constitution, was the principal doctrinal device
by which Federalists on the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John
Marshall and his ideological soul mate, Joseph Story, promoted entrepreneurial republicanism. The doctrine first took shape in the famous Yazoo land case, Fletcher v. Peck.13
The transactional background of the case was typical of the type of
entrepreneurial activity that was common at the beginning of the
nineteenth century-land speculation. The Georgia legislature in
1795 statutorily authorized the Governor to convey the Yazoo lands, a
huge expanse of land in the western portion of Georgia, now constituting the states of Alabama and Mississippi, to four land speculating
companies. The deal was incredibly sweet: for $500,000 in specie
currency, the companies received two-thirds of the territory between
the Chattahoochee River, the present western boundary of Georgia,
and the Mississippi, between the Tennessee and Florida borders, a total of thirty-five million acres. The sale has been called, with little
exaggeration, "[tihe greatest real estate deal in history."14 Typical of
most land speculation at that time, the sale was corrupted by bribes,
mostly cash and shares in the companies.15 A year later, after public
scandal over the bribes had broken out and a new legislature elected,
the deal was rescinded. In the meantime, the four original land companies had already sold millions of acres of the Yazoo land to other
speculators and individual settlers, mostly from New England. The
sales earned enormous profits for the original Yazoo companies. In
the most important of the sales, the New England Mississippi Land
Company, whose investors included prominent Connecticut and Massachusetts politicians, bought most of the Georgia Mississippi Company's eleven million acres for $1,138,000, yielding the Georgia
company a profit of nearly 650 percent on its original investment!
Some of the more legally cognizant of the New England buyers
sought the legal opinion of Alexander Hamilton regarding the validity
of the original sale after the legislature's rescission. Hamilton,
although emphasizing that he had not had an opportunity to search
the Georgia land titles, gave an opinion that was favorable to the New
Englanders:
[I]t may be safely said to be a contravention of the first principles of natural
justice and social policy... to revoke a grant of property regularly made for
valuable consideration, under legislative authority, to the prejudice even of
13. 10 U.S. 48, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).
14. 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARsHALL 551 (1919).
15. The story of the Georgia legislature's finagling is told in C. PETER MAGRATH,
YAzoo: LAw AND PoLrrIcs IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: Tim CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK

4-19 (1966), and BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 546-602.
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third persons, on every supposition, innocent of the alleged fraud or
16
corruption.

With this opinion in hand, two of the New England investors challenged the validity of the legislative repeal through an arranged lawsuit. John Peck nominally sold his holdings to Robert Fletcher, and
per their prearrangement, Fletcher sued Peck to try title, arguing that
the sale breached the contract's covenant of good title.
The case posed a conflict between the security of land titles, once
created by the legislature, and the power of the legislature to correct
its prior acts that were the direct result of corruption. In a very real
sense this conflict translated into one between entrepreneurialism
and republican virtue. From the perspective of republican theory, it
would surely appear vital to the integrity of representative self-governance that one legislature has the power to correct fraudulent acts
of its predecessor. Of course, correction of corrupt legislative action in
this context did not necessarily mean annulling the initial sale. The
dictates of corrective justice, if that were the sole concern, would have
been met by affirming the transfer of title but requiring that the seller
reimburse the state, as representative of the people of Georgia, for the
amount of the purchase price. But republican ideology is more than
corrective justice. Republicanism requires, above all else, that the integrity-the "virtue," to use the preferred term-of elected representatives and the governmental institutions that they constitute not be
compromised and that, if and when they are compromised, the acts of
corruption be publicly declared void so that there remains no consequences that would possibly symbolize the corruption's efficacy.
From the perspective of promoting entrepreneurial activity, land
titles have to be kept clear and simple. It is especially important to
the health of the market that innocent buyers be able to rely on the
apparent legal soundness of titles when engaging in exchange transactions and that they not be made to bear the risk of loss that they did
not create and of which they had no reasonable opportunity to learn.
The concern with clarifying land titles was especially important in the
context of Yazoo. The Yazoo lands were already subject to a variety of
conflicting claims. Spain, the United States government, and at least
four Indian tribes claimed title to various portions of Yazoo. These
disputes alone were not enough to cool the speculation fever. People
were willing to assume the risk of loss because the prospects for gaining their fortunes seemed high enough, just as people today will risk
large amounts of money at the race track or on the state lottery even
though the odds against their winning are extremely high. Georgia's
policy of settling its frontier through favorable land sales would be
seriously jeopardized, however, if subsequent purchasers who bought
16. Alexander Hamilton's Opinion on the Georgia Repeal Act, reprintedin MAGRATH,
supra note 15, app. D at 150.
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land from land companies with no notice of fraud were subject to losing their titles through legislative repeal of the original legislative
grants. Out-of-state land speculators might be foolish enough to buy
land sight unseen, but few of them would be willing to assume the risk
that the state might snatch their titles away from them at any time.
The marketability of land in Georgia's western territory, then, seemed
to require that titles, once vested in private hands, be protected
against subsequent legislative action.
In addition to the concerns with land titles, one school of economic
thought also supported the Yazoo purchasers. Georgia's program of
granting the rights to its western lands to a select group of land speculation companies was a product of mercantilist economic theory, an
approach to encouraging economic development that most Federalists
favored. Mercantilist theory, which was eventually replaced as the
reigning theory by the classical economics of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo, posited two basic claims: first, economic development requires extensive and active participation by the government in entrepreneurial activities; second, to encourage entrepreneurs to invest
in some desired activity, the state must give them exclusive privileges
or monopoly rights. 1 7 The Georgia legislation and the governor's subsequent grants illustrated both of these principles. To settle and develop its western territory, the state government did not passively rely
on the workings of the market but actively encouraged investment.
Beginning in the 1780s, the state had adopted an extremely liberal
policy of granting lands to new settlers.lS Successive governors tried
to outdo each other in the number of acres they granted per person.
This policy, combined with pervasive mania for land speculation
throughout the nation, led to countless instances of fraud. Literally
millions of acres of non-existent land were sold to gullible investors,
many in the North and even Europe. Nearly all of these unfortunate
souls paid for ghost titles to what promotion literature made out to be
a virtual paradise without ever seeing what they were supposedly
buying. (This practice continues today in the sort of land promotion
deals vividly depicted in the recent play Glengarry Glen Ross).
The other tenet of mercantilist economics was also met. The bulk
of the Yazoo lands were deeded to a few land speculation companies.
These companies, in effect, held exclusive privileges to sell and settle
Yazoo. The fact that they were able to earn near-monopoly profits
from sales was, according to mercantilist reasoning, a necessary consequence of a policy designed to encourage risk-taking.
17. On the role of mercantilist theory in the early republic and eventual replacement
by classical economics, see HERBERT HovEIKn', ENTERPRISE AND AmERCAN
LAw, 1836-1937, at 11-35 (1991).
18. See MAGRATH, supra note 15, at 3.
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The conflict between these two perspectives, republican and entrepreneurial, would seem to have placed John Marshall in a quandary. Though a staunch Federalist and a lifelong opponent of
Jefferson and his mode of democratic politics, Marshall, like virtually
all other political leaders of his time, firmly believed in the basic tenets of republican ideology. The blatant legislative corruption behind
the land deal was especially worrisome to the republican mind, as
Marshall explicitly indicated: "That corruption should find its way
into the governments of our infant republics, and contaminate the
very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to
the passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are
circumstances most deeply to be deplored."'19
There were two reasons why entrepreneurial interests took precedence for Marshall. First, like most other Federalists in the early republic, Marshall's brand of republicanism had far more in common
with Hamilton's thought than it did with Jefferson's. Indeed, from the
Jeffersonian perspective, Federalist encouragement of entrepreneurship was a perversion of republic ideals. Marshall and other Federalists had no confidence in the capacity of citizens to act virtuously, in
the classical sense of that term. The common good was maximized
through policies that appealed to self-interest rather than by expecting individuals to subordinate their self-interest to the good of others.
The second reason is that Federalist-Whigs, whom I have called
entrepreneurial republicans, wanted to protect entrepreneurial interests for reasons in addition to the strictly economic concern with increasing social wealth. James Willard Hurst was quite correct in
pointing out that the vested-rights doctrine developed primarily to
protect venture capital, 20 but the entrepreneurial republicans' protection of venture capital stemmed from political and social concerns as
well as economic considerations. It was important to protect this capital not for its own sake but for what it represented: the proper social
order, headed by a small number of men who possessed that requisite
experience, intelligence, and wisdom to lead. The suppliers of venture
capital in the early republic were all community and political leaders,
men like Marshall, who himself engaged in land speculation. 2 1 Actions like the Georgia repeal statute represented the most serious
threat to that order-the urge of democratic legislatures to disrupt the
natural hierarchy.
19. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48, 72, 6 Cranch 87, 130 (1810).
20. See HURST, supra note 2, at 25.
21. See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 31 n.13 (1938). Albert Beveridge's famous biography of Marshall, however

else flawed, was correct in pointing out that Marshall's interest in stability of
contractual obligations and land titles in particular stemmed in no small part
from legal challenges to his own estates. See BEVERIDGE, supra note 14, at 582.
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The rhetoric of the repeal act itself fueled such fears of radical democracy. The repeal act was inspired by democratic hatred of arrangements that conferred privileges on the few. Fully three-quarters
of the act consisted of a rambling preamble that linked the state's sovereignty to the protection of democracy. In selling the Yazoo lands to
"a few individuals," the previous legislature acted contrary to the interests of
democratical ... government founded on equality of rights, and which is totally opposed to all proprietary grants or monopolies in favor of a few, which
tend to build up that destructive aristocracy in the new, which is tumbling in
the old world; and which, if permitted, must end in the annihilation of democracy and equal rights-those rights and principles of government,
which our
virtuous forefathers fought for and established with their blood. 2 2

Language such as this suggested to Marshall that what was at
stake was the validity of the alleged principle that "a legislature may,
by its own act, divest the vested estate of any man whatever, for reasons which shall, by itself, be deemed sufficient."2 3 That asserted
principle set the stage for a conflict between the republican doctrine of
political relativism and the entrepreneurial requirement of secure
land titles: "Is the power of the legislature competent to the annihilation of such title [that is, of a bona fide purchaser], and to a resumption of the property thus held?"24
Marshall's response to that question began by acknowledging the
"correctness" of the principle of political relativism as a general proposition: "one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former
legislature was competent to pass; and . . . one legislature cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature."25 But although that
principle was valid with respect to "general legislation," it did not necessarily apply with respect to an individual who has acted in reliance
on a legislative act. This was especially true where title to land has
been transferred:
[I]f an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. The
past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power. Conveyances have been
made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates may
be seized by the sovereign authority,
still, that they originally vested is a fact,
26
and cannot cease to be a fact.

Vitiating legislative sales of property whenever facts subsequently
disclosed that the sales were tainted by corruption was incompatible
with maintaining good order and stability. After all, the line between
influence peddling and corruption is exceedingly thin, if not non-existent. One legislature could always find some evidence that the act of a
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Georgia Repeal Act of 1796, reprinted in MAGRATH, supranote 15, app. B at 127.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48, 75, 6 Cranch 87, 134 (1810).
Id. at 75, 6 Cranch at 135.
Id.
Id.
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prior legislature was the product of influence peddling. Screaming
"corruption," it could then destroy the property interests that its predecessor had created. The scenario of legislative disruption could be
extended to truly nightmarish proportions. Since the repeal act itself
would doubtless have been the product of interest-group politics, the
next legislature, perhaps recaptured by the ousted property owners,
might undo the repeal, creating an endless circle of legislative action
and repeal. Marshall was not simply splitting hairs when he asked
how much and what sort of corruption would be sufficient to allow the
legislature to repeal its prior act.
Must it be direct corruption? or would interest or undue influence of any kind
be sufficient? Must the vitiating cause operate on a majority? or on what
number of members? Would the act be null, whatever might be the wish of
the nation? 7 or would its obligation or nullity depend upon the public
2
sentiment?

Maintaining the social and political order required that this sort of
legislative sabotage, rationalized under the rubric of democracy, be
blocked at the outset. Vested property rights were the device for securing that order. Entrepreneurial policy, understood in these terms,
then, must trump the republican principle of legislative self-correction
whenever legislative action created property rights.28
27. Id. at 73, 6 Cranch at 130.
28. The legal basis for this conclusion is not entirely clear from the text of Marshall's
opinion in Fletcher. Scholars have disagreed whether Marshall intended that one
basis for the decision was natural law. On the one hand, his opinion is replete
with references to "certain great principles of justice." 10 U.S. at 74, 6 Cranch at
133. Some scholars have interpreted that language as indicating that natural
law was the Court's primary basis for the decision. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 604 (abr. ed. Oxford
Univ. Press 1991) (1988). David Currie has recently pointed out, though, that
Marshall's statement that legislative repeal cannot "divest" vested property
rights is better read as a statement of fact than of law. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at
131 (1985). Moreover, Currie persuasively argues, Marshall may have regarded
the "general principles" to which he referred as principles as being properly read
into the Georgia state constitution's delegation of legislative power. See id. at
132.
Whether or not Marshall viewed natural law as an independent basis for the
decision in Fletcher,he clearly did base the decision, at least alternatively, on the
contract clause of the federal Constitution. Eager to define a broad scope of applicability for this clause, Marshall dismissed the possible objection, based on the
familiar common law distinction, that the legislative transfer of land was a "conveyance," not a "contract." That distinction might have led the Court to conclude
that the legislature's rescission of its earlier conveyance was an uncompensated
taking of title, governed by the Fifth Amendment, and not an impairment of contract. Approaching the case that way, however, would have left the grantee without any constitutional protection since the Takings Clause applied only to action
by the federal government. Citing Blackstone, Marshall reasoned that the term
"contract" includes those that are executed as well as executory contracts. See
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 48, 76, 6 Cranch 87, 136-37 (1810). A grant, moreover,
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Community and Competition: The Charles
River Bridge Case

Charles River Bridge was constructed under the authority of a
1785 corporate charter that the Massachusetts legislature granted to
a group of local businessmen for the purpose of connecting Boston and
Charlestown. 29 The charter initially gave the owners the right to collect tolls for a period of forty years, but the period was later extended
to seventy years. The investment was hugely profitable for the owners, due largely to the tremendous population increases of the two
communities. For a total outlay of $70,000, the bridge was collecting
tolls of $30,000 a year by 1828.30 By 1814, stock in the Charles River
Bridge corporation was selling at more than 600 percent over its initial price.31
In 1823, a group of Charlestown merchants petitioned the legislature for a charter to build a toll-free bridge. The petition provoked
howls from several quarters, including, predictably, from the Charles
River Bridge proprietors, who claimed that the proposed bridge would
destroy their property rights. The legislature rejected this and several
subsequent petitions. Finally, in 1828, prompted by an anti-monopoly
propaganda campaign, the legislature granted the petition to construct the Warren Bridge. The new bridge was located only a few hundred feet away from the Charles River Bridge. The charter authorized
the Warren Bridge corporation to charge the same toll as the Charles
River Bridge but only for six years. It also provided that after the
owners had recovered their costs plus five percent interest, the bridge
32
would revert to the state.
When the Warren Bridge opened, the predicable effect on the older
bridge occurred. The Charles River Bridge corporation's earnings revenues declined by nearly one-half within six months, as the public extolled the virtues of the new bridge.33 By 1837, when the United
States Supreme Court decided the case, the corporation was earning
nothing on its investment.3 4
The conflict between two types of legislatively-created property interests, one an established monopoly and the other a prospective com-

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

includes an implied contract by the grantor not to reassert his rights in the future. See id. Marshall might have pointed out, although, curiously, he did not,
that it was well established in the common law that a conveyance ordinarily implied a warranty of title and that this warranty barred a later action by the grantor against the grantee for the land. See A.W.B. SnuPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY OF =H LAND LAw 118-19 (1961).
The best telling of the case's story is KUTLER, supra note 11.
See HoRwrrz, supra note 10, at 130.
See KUTLER, supra note 11, at 1-2.
See id.
See id. at 35.
See HoRwrrz, supra note 10, at 130.
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petitor, could not have been more starkly posed, and it left both the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the Marshall Court unable affirmatively to reach a decision. The Massachusetts court was
evenly split over whether the Charles River Bridge's charter, which
was silent as to whether its owners had an exclusive privilege to operate a bridge over the Charles River, should be construed to have
granted such a privilege by implication. 3 5 The judges dismissed the
complaint in order to permit an appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.
That the Court would hear the case was not in doubt, for the dispute over two bridges had taken on much deeper political and economic implications. Politically, the dispute represented the conflict
between aristocrats and democrats. The proponents of the Warren
Bridge portrayed themselves as champions of the common good and
their opponents as exemplars of the old New England aristocracy,
which maintained its power through state-created monopolies. 3 6 Economically, there could not have been a clearer example of the tension
between the old view that exclusive privileges were a necessary inducement for entrepreneurs and the ascendent view that such privileges stifled economic growth and that free competition was the
correct path to economic development. At a more concrete level, that
conflict between two economic theories translated into whether speculators in railroad and other new technologies would be able to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by older forms of transportation, such as
canals.37
Between 1831 and 1837, the Supreme Court was unable to reach a
decision in the case. Part of the reason for the indecision was various
absences and personnel changes on the Court, including Marshall's
death and replacement by Roger Taney. It also appears, though, that
the Marshall Court was deadlocked by a 3-3-1 vote, with Marshall
himself on the side of the Warren Bridge owners. 38 After reargument,
a divided Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the statute and the
power of state legislatures to grant competing corporate charters.
It is customary to depict Charles River Bridge as the watershed
decision that signaled the end of the Supreme Court's protection of
35. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass.
349, 7 Pick. 344 (1829).
36. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMIAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 224 (1985).
37. See KUTLER, supra note 11, at 50-53.
38. See id. at 176-79. Further evidence that Marshall favored upholding the Massachusetts statute comes from Simon Greenleafs statement that he had been "credibly informed" that Marshall "held the charter of Warren Bridge constitutional."
2 WILLIAM CRUISE, DIGEST OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 68 (Simon Greenleaf
ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1850).
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vested property rights under the contract clause.3 9 It is as if two
events alone, Andrew Jackson's election in 1828 and the choice of
Roger Taney to succeed John Marshall as Chief Justice, were enough
to turn the Marshall Court's contract clause jurisprudence on its head.
No one would (or should) be foolish enough to suggest that those two
events had no effect on the question of political control over property
interests. It is beyond disputing that CharlesRiver Bridge did signify
a change from the attitude that produced Fletcher v. Peck and
Dartmouth College.40 But continuity accompanied change. The Marshall and Taney Courts shared a commitment to promoting and protecting entrepreneurial activity. More fundamentally, they also
shared the insight that entrepreneurialism was valuable for sociopolitical reasons as much as for the strictly economic purpose of increasing wealth. What principally separates the property thought of
the two Courts is the identity of the socio-political role of entrepreneurial activity. While the Marshall Court understood entrepreneurial activity as a means for maintaining the proper social
order and, therefore, protected only those entrepreneurial interests
that were established and stable, that is, "vested," the Taney court
understood entrepreneurship as a force for undermining hierarchical
privileges and opening up opportunities for the broader community.
This was the crucial difference between entrepreneurial republicanism to democratic entrepreneurialism.
The two major opinions in the case, Taney's for the majority and
Story's dissent, perfectly reflected the discourses of these two understandings of entrepreneurialism. Taney's opinion has been described
as "brief, lucid, and to the point."41 It was all that, but it was not
without rhetoric that disclosed a deep-seated vision of how society and
politics ought to be ordered and of the role of entrepreneurial property
interests in that socio-political order. Woven into Taney's technical
legal analysis of whether the Charles River Bridge corporation's charter implied a right to exclude competitors is a recurrent dialectic between two sets of terms, "privilege" and "monopoly," on the one hand,
and "community" and "competition," on the other. In the course of discussing the English rule of construction against implied grants, for
example, Taney stated,
[I]t would present a singular spectacle, if, while the courts in England are
restraining, within the strictest limits, the spirit of monopoly, and exclusive
privileges in the nature of monopolies, and confining corporations to the privileges plainly given to them in their charter; the courts of this country should
be found enlarging these privileges by implication; and construing a statute
39. See, e.g., Morton Keller, Law, Enterprise and the Marketplace of Ideas:
Hornkemp's View, 18 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 337, 343 (1993). But see CuRME, supra
note 28, at 150; WPiGnT, supra note 21, at 62-63, 245-46.
40. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
41. CuRumE, supra note 28, at 209.
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more unfavorably to the public, and to the rights of the 42
community, than

would be done in a like case in an English court of justice.

The rhetorical force in this passage derives from its juxtaposition
of the terms "privileges" and "rights of the community." In using the
term "privilege," Taney was drawing on several traditions that had
coalesced in Jacksonian political-legal rhetoric. One of those traditions was the English attack on monopolies that was widely associated
with the name Adam Smith. This was the basis for Taney's ironic observation that England, that hierarchically-ordered society extra
ordinaire,had lately adopted a more hostile policy toward monopolies
than had the United States. Taney's assault on privilege did not draw
only on liberal political economy, however, for another tradition in
which "privilege" was a conspicuous target was civic republicanism,
particularly its eighteenth-century American incarnation. Attacking
legally-created privileges as un-American was established as a common theme in political-legal tracts in the revolutionary era, and it continued to be prominent well into the nineteenth century, especially
among Jacksonians. The Jacksonian interpretation of republicanism
emphasized its democratic possibilities, in contrast with the Federalist-Whig interpretation, which stressed its belief in social hierarchy
and political order. To Jacksonians, the idea that there was a proper
order which the government should maintain, among other ways, by
extending exclusive property privileges to the certain social groups
perverted the basic insights of civic republicanism. The opportunity of
all citizens to participate in the nation's economic as well as political
life, not maintaining an entrenched hierarchy, was the core of
republicanism.
The use of the term "community" is more intriguing because it is
more ambiguous. Taney used it several times in his opinion, repeatedly referring to the "rights of the community." In a revealing passage, Taney stated that "while the rights of private property are
sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have
rights, and that the happiness and well being of every citizen depends
on their faithful preservation."4 3 One possible reading of this statement is that Taney was appealing to the theme, which would become
increasingly common in nineteenth-century critiques of private property, that property and democracy are antithetical to each other. But
that interpretation is implausible. Taney was no man of the Left, in
the modern sense of being opposed to the institution of private property. To the contrary, Taney strongly supported that institution and,
more particularly, its entrepreneurial form. Taney had inherited the
Jeffersonian understanding of democracy as a polity of property-own42. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 545-46 (1837).
43. Id. at 548.
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ing citizens. Property rights might undermine democracy, but it was
not inevitable that they would do so. The key was to maintain the
opportunity for those without property to gain it.
Taney did not opposed private property as such, but property that
was part of an entrenched hierarchy. He drew a sharp distinction between property of the old order and property of the new order. Property of the ancien regime were those interests that the state had
granted to a favored few, giving them exclusive privileges. That was
precisely the sort of interest that the Marshall Court had protected in
Fletcher v. Peck, Dartmouth College, and other Contract Clause cases,
and it was also precisely the type of interest that the Charles River
Bridge owners were claiming here.
The old property had been the basis for a socio-political order that
was, to Taney's way of thinking, not only rankly hierarchical but also
incompatible with progress. Like the Scottish Enlightenment social
theorists of the eighteenth century, 44 he rejected the civic republicans'
fear of change. Taney regarded change as a positive, "progressive"
force, and economic growth was, for him, a crucial aspect of social progress. Economic development, in turn, required competition, not monopolies. This was clear from his celebration of economic development
as serving the public good:
[Tihe object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established .... And in a country like
ours, free, active, and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and
wealth; new channels of communication are daily found necessary, both for
travel and trade;
and are essential to the comfort, convenience, and prosperity
45
of the people.

"Monopolies," understood as exclusive property interests, can be
attacked from two perspectives. One is economic theory. We have already alluded to the liberal critique of monopolies that began with
Adam Smith. That theory gained in the mid-nineteenth century, as it
became clearer that more private capital became available for investment canals, roads, and other key aspects of the transportation
revolution. Exclusive privileges no longer seemed as necessary a price
to pay to encourage entrepreneurs to jump into these ventures. 4 6
The other angle from which one can attack monopolies is politics,
and this was the basis for Taney's opposition to monopolies. Taney's
primary concern was with making democracy, not the market, work.
Opening up the market was simply a means to democratic ends, for
44. On the Scottish Enlightenment, see generally GnADYs BRYsoN, MAN AND Socmrv.
THE SCOMrISH INQUIRY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1945), and RONALD L.

MEEK, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE (1976).
45. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) at 547.
46. See STUART BRUCHEY, THE WEALTH OF THE NATION: AN ECONOAC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 65 (1988).
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economic competition, from his perspective, served the interests of democracy. This is the key to understanding his repeated references to
the "rights of the community." He wanted to assure that when it created entrepreneurial interests, the state did not contribute to the imbalance of power that existed under the old hierarchical order. The
only way to prevent state-created property interests from serving the
interests of powerful elites was for the democratically-elected legislature to retain control over them. The vested-rights doctrine immunized, or nearly so, such interests from politics, and Taney's
repudiation of that doctrine-declaring that property rights, while
"sacred," are always subordinated to the rights of the "community"was intended to expose them to democratic politics.
Where, then, does this leave Charles River Bridge with respect to
corporations and the conception of property as commodity? Charles
River Bridge can be characterized as consistent with commodificationist thought to the extent that its consequence was to expose state-created franchises to competition and, in that sense, moved them into the
realm of the market. But even in terms of effect, the decision only
tangentially supported the commodity conception. The critical element of commodificationism is the understanding of an asset's principle function as increasing social wealth through market transfers.
Charles River Bridge did not effect a transformation of publicly-created franchises into commodities in that sense. No one suggested that
corporate franchises should be freely transferable in the market,
although shares in the corporation's stock was transferable. Permitting the free transfer of a corporation's franchise would effectively
have ceded power to the corporation to determine who enjoys the privilege for which the corporation was created. It would also have given
corporations virtually unilateral control over their existence. Despite
the growing sense of the privateness of private corporations, neither of
these powers could be recognized. The corporation was still regarded
as created by the state to serve the state's interest. "A corporation,"
the leading treatise on corporations declared in 1846, "can have no
legal existence out of the sovereignty by which it is created . . .47
The scope of the market's domain may have been widening by midcentury with respect to other institutions, but it had not widened with
respect to corporations, at least not in the sense of removing corporations from the sphere of politics.
The Court's rhetoric in Charles River Bridge reflected the influence
of commodificationism even less than the decision's consequences did.
Taney's opinion was filled with the rhetoric of the rights of the community, not the market, of politics, not economics. Fundamentally, it
signified a preoccupation with dismantling a social hierarchy sup47.
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ported by stated-conferred exclusive entrepreneurial interests, not
with wealth maximization. Entrepreneurial corporate property, Taney was declaring, might increase individual wealth, but primarily
they had to serve the interests of the community as a whole.
Neither the vested rights doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck and
Dartmouth College nor Charles River Bridge, then, was premised on
the commodity conception of property. None of them reflected an attempt to move entrepreneurial interests into the sphere of the market.
The Marshall Court decisions protected certain property interests as
the foundation for a particular type of social order. Charles River
Bridge symbolized an attack on that order by extending democratic
control over one of its most powerful institutions. For antebellum lawyers on both sides, the ascendency of entrepreneurial property posed a
problem that was fundamentally social and political in nature, not
economic.
III.

PROPRIETY IN THE WELFARE STATE:
THE "NEW PROPERTY"

A.

Institutional Changes in Property

In the mid- to late twentieth century welfarism as a state policy
fundamentally changed private property both as a social institution
and as a legal concept. As an institution, property in the welfare state
was more obviously public than it had been throughout the nineteenth
century. Three characteristics defined the mid-twentieth century
American welfare state:
(1) a vast increase in the range and detail of government regulation of privately owned economic enterprise; (2) the direct furnishing of services by government to individual members of the national community-unemployment
and retirement benefits, family allowances, low-cost housing, medical care,
and the like; and (3) increasing government ownership and operation of industries and businesses which, at an earlier time, were or48would have been operated for profit by individuals or private corporations.

All three of these characteristics overtly shifted the character of property from the private to the public realm. Welfare benefit programs, of
which Social Security (first created in 1935) was the prototype, had
the effect of identifying the government as the direct source not simply
of "services" but wealth for increasing numbers of Americans. To be
sure, during the 1930s, Social Security played only a limited role in
providing income through its retirement and unemployment insurance programs. 4 9 Still, even during these early years its effect was to
challenge the classical liberal principle that people should acquire
48. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 143,
144 (1958).
49. See GABRIEL KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN AMERIcAN HISTORY 144-45

(1976).
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property only through private means-creation, or more commonly,
market exchange. The government was now a third source of wealth
for millions of Americans.
A related institutional change was that regulation increasingly
weakened the prerogatives of private property, particularly business
property. Most New Dealers were strongly committed to an "aggressively statist" approach to the economy for the purpose of protecting
consumers and workers. New Deal policymakers considered these two
groups to be particularly ill-served by unregulated corporate capitalism, and they pushed for legislation that sought to protect vulnerable
groups by imposing mandatory contractual terms and creating new
regulatory regimes for certain industries.50 Legislation like the Communications Act (1934), the Railroad Retirement Act (1934), the Fair
Labor Standards Act (1937), the Public Utilities Holding Company Act
of 1935 (the Wheeler-Rayburn law), and, above all, the Wagner Act
(1935) altered many of the prerogatives of private property ownership
for employers and business owners, although they were far from producing the radical revision of property relations as many opponents
51
feared they would.
The social legislation of the 1960s, especially the Great Society programs, deepened this institutional change in property. State as well
as federal legislation greatly extended the range of property relationship that were subject to government regulation. Housing is a particularly striking example. The relationship between landlords and their
tenants, which traditionally were subject to minimal legal regulation,
underwent a massive legal change during the 1960s. 52 Federal legislation like the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited discrimination in
the private housing market on the basis of race, religion, gender, and
national origin.53 At the state level, many states, prompted by court
decisions, enacted statutes creating a "warranty of habitability" that
guaranteed tenants the right to live in safe and livable conditions.
These statutes reversed the traditional legal rule that allocated to tenants the responsibility for the care and condition of rental housing.
The most important aspect of this new warranty was that it was nonwaivable; landlords and tenants could not bargain around the new
50. See Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE NEW DRAT ORDER, 1930-1980, at 85, 94 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstie eds.,
1989).
51. On the Wagner Act and its judicial defanging, see Karl E. Mare, JudicialDeradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978).
52. The best overviews of these changes are Charles Donahue Jr., Change in the
American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REv. 242 (1974), and Mary
Ann Glendon, The TransformationofAmerican Landlord-TenantLaw, 23 B.C. L.
REv. 503 (1982).
53. The current version of the Act is 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619. (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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warranty even if they were so inclined. The overall effect of these and
other changes was to remove landlord and tenant relations, especially
in the residential context, from the realm of private ordering to the
domain of public regulation. The new regulatory regime withdrew
from landlords many of the traditional prerogatives of property
ownership.
B.

Changes in the Idea of Property in the Welfare State

The welfare state affected ideas about and attitudes toward property at least as much as it did the institution of property. For Americans, the emergence of the modern welfare state created a legitimacy
crisis concerning property in a way that it never did for Europeans,
whose legal-political-economic orders had shifted to welfarism considerably earlier. European legal and non-legal thought regarding property was explicitly dialectical even before the appearance of the
modern welfare state. Americans lacked the same tradition of consciousness about the dialectic character of property. While American
lawyers today recognize that there is no inherent contradiction between the institution of private property and a regulated economy,
that point was much less clear to self-styled defenders of private property at the time of the New Deal. Those who associated private property with unregulated markets viewed the growth of the federal
government's regulatory apparatus under the New Deal as signaling
the end of private property as they knew it.
The most fundamental effect of the social welfare programs on the
idea of property was that they undermined the commodity conception.
Various types of property which traditionally were regarded as market assets came to be seen as serving other, non-market functions. On
those occasions when free market transferability seemed to threaten
these functions, the law changed to protect the non-commodified aspects of property arrangements.
Landlord-and-tenant law again provides a clear example. The
"revolution," as it has been called,5 4 in the law regulating landlordtenant relations was based on the implicit premise that residential
housing should not be treated solely as a market asset, subject to being bought or sold on whatever terms the parties want. At least as
important as the economic function is a political-moral function: residential housing is one of the crucial material conditions that determines whether and how people will flourish personally and as
citizens. 5 5 Courts and legal scholars explained the legal changes cre54. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
Causes and Consequences, 69 CoRNELL L. REV. 517 (1984).
55. For powerful expressions of the perception of housing as non-commodity, see
Margaret Jane Radin, ResidentialRent Control, 15 Pam. & Pus. Ars. 350 (1986),
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ating new rights for tenants as based on a shift from antiquated feudal property law to contract law, but that account was very
misleading. The new tenants' rights rules were not entirely consistent
with contract law and certainly were not contractarian in the sense of
reflecting a commitment to private ordering. The real basis for the
overall doctrinal shift was a change in how the legal culture perceived
the character of residential housing. Margaret Jane Radin has articulated the new perception that underlies legal protection of the tenant's
interest in this way:
A tenancy, no less than a single-family house, is the sort of property interest
in which a person becomes self-invested; and after the self-investment has
taken place, retention of the interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests of others. To pursue the parallel with home
ownership, there the owner's interest is personal and the mortgagee's interest
her
is fimgible. That is why it seems right to safeguard the owner from losing
56
home even if it means some curtailment of the mortgagee's interest.

That is, while the landlord's interest, like the mortgage lender's, is
(usually) strictly financial-a commodity-the tenant's property interest is primarily personal and only secondarily financial. Tenants
enter into leases primarily to have a home, a place in which to belong,
not as an investment. Protecting that personal interest means treating it as at least somewhat outside the domain of market ordering, in
which the rights and duties of the two sides are set through the process of bargaining. The new landlord-tenant rules replaced bargaining with legally-imposed terms regulating the relationship precisely to
protect the tenant's non-commodity interest from the possibly corrosive effects of the market.
Welfare programs that created government benefits for the poor,
the elderly, and the disadvantaged also made the commodity character of property problematic but in a different way. A critical aspect of
commodity ownership is that it liberates the individual owner from
dependency on the state, or at least it minimizes the degree to which
the owner is subject to state control. Under fully commodified ownership, the owners are free to decide how to use or sell their property so
that they may satisfy their preferences as they see fit. Recipients of
government benefits generally lack that degree of autonomous control
over the wealth that the state transfers to them. The benefits may be
subject to various state-imposed conditions and restrictions, but even
where they are not, the welfare recipient is still beholden to the state.
The most vivid manifestation of that personal insecurity is that the
government may, and in some cases, has, terminated the program,
and therefore, the benefits altogether. That degree of personal insecurity is, at least theoretically, inconsistent with commodity ownership.
and William H. Simon, Social-RepublicanProperty,38 UCLA L. Rzv. 1335, 135668 (1991).
56. Radin, supra note 55, at 365.
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Scholars responded to this predicament generally in two ways.
Classical liberals, who regarded the minimal state as the only political
regime that is compatible with individual freedom, argued that the
welfare state had to be dismantled. Beginning in the 1940s, classical
liberals like Friedrich Hayek mounted a strong campaign against all
forms of government economic planning, in which they included most
welfare programs, as undermining the rules of law. The rule of law
ideal presupposed, they argued, hard-and-fast rules that minimize the
degree of central discretion and intervention. Welfare programs rely
on an approach of "administrative coercion and discrimination"5 7 that
contradicts that requirement.
Welfare rights advocates responded to the traditional liberal critique by treating welfare benefits as property. In effect, these scholars
conceded the basic premise of the Hayekian argument, that a discretionary welfare regime jeopardizes the rule-of-law ideal and individual freedom, but they rejected the conclusion that the welfare state
had to be sacrificed to protect individual liberty. These reformist liberals, of whom the Yale law professor Charles Reich was the most
prominent legal scholar, tried to accommodate the welfare state with
the rule of law by doctrinally transforming welfare benefits from largess into legally-protected property.58
These two responses defined the parameters of political-legal discourse about property in the welfare state for much of the mid-to late
twentieth century. They created a dialectic about the commodity conception of property that was apparent and increasingly contentious by
the last quarter of the century.
C.

The Origins and Development of the "New Property"

In a retrospective on his article, Reich summarized its basic objective. "The New Property,"Reich stated, "was written twenty-five years
ago as a suggestion for the legal effort to build a system of protection
for the individual."59 Reich thought that the nation was experiencing
a "crisis of the individual."60 The crisis that he saw reflected the pivotal, Janus-faced character of the time at which he wrote. Looking in
one direction, the memory of McCarthyesque government tyranny of
individual liberty was still very fresh. Reich cited a wide array of
more recent instances in which the government had taken steps to
repress dissident behavior by cutting off government benefits or denying government-granted licenses. It was easy to view those cases as
latter-day McCarthyism. But the cases could be viewed from a differ57. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOm at x (1967) (1944).
58. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
59. Charles A. Reich, The New PropertyAfter 25 Years, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 223, 224
(1990).
60. Id. at 223.
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ent perspective, one that required looking to the future. The victims
that Reich identified, unlike their McCarthyite predecessors, were all
dependent in some direct way on the government for their livelihood.
Their personal wealth derived directly from the government, making
them insecure even before the government had taken any repressive
action against them. That condition-direct personal dependency on
the government for the very means of one's existence-has since become a major feature of American life and the overriding problem associated with the welfare state.
The cases that Reich cited as evidence of the crisis all were instances of a continuing, if less conspicuous, threat to individual freedom by direct government repression: a cut-off of Social Security
benefits to a recipient who had once been a member of the Communist
Party, 61 a denial of welfare benefits to a mother who was living with a
man out of wedlock, 62 and a refusal to admit to the bar a man who
refused to answer questions concerning membership in "subversive"
organizations. 63 Joseph McCarthy might be dead, but it was still
"scoundrel time."64
What connected all these was the growing dependence of Americans of government largess that was subject to substantive conditions.
As Robert Rabin has observed:
The major contribution of Reich's article was to pull together the multiple
strands of conditional largess apparent in government programs and activities ranging across the spectrum of jobs, welfare benefits, grants-in-aid,
licenses and franchises, and to link these forms of"new property" to the corre65
sponding insistence that recipients meet appropriate behavioral standards.

No case better illustrated this phenomenon, or provoked Reich's
anxiety, than the Supreme Court's 1960 decision in Flemming v. Nestor.6 6 Nestor, who had immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria
in 1913, had been receiving Social Security retirement benefits since
1955 when he was deported to his native country for his membership
in the Communist Party between 1933 and 1939. Membership in
"subversive organizations" at any time was one of the statutory bases
for termination of old-age benefits, and the government terminated
his shortly after it deported him.67 He challenged the action as a deprivation of his property under the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause. The Supreme Court held Nestor's interest in Social Security
benefits was not an "accrued property right" protectable against the
See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
See Reich, supra note 58, at 761-62.
See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
See generally LiLLIAN HEs .N, SCOUNDREL TimE (1976).
Robert L. Rabin, The Administrative State and Its Excesses: Reflections on The
New Property, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 273, 277 (1990).
66. See Reich, supra note 58, at 768-70.
67. See id. at 768.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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government's substantive interference. 6S It was a weaker sort of interest that was protectable only against arbitrary government action,
which, the Court said, was not involved in the case. 69
Reich characterized the Nestor Court's theory as "the philosophy of
feudal tenure."7 0 It treated his interest in Social Security benefits as
non-vested, subject to conditions designed to compel the performance
of certain duties. "Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal
through a system of mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty,"
Reich objected, "so government largess binds man to the state."71 The
bond that it created between recipients and the state, more to the
point, was one that deprived individuals of their very freedom, precisely the same objection that Hayek had leveled against the welfare
state.
Reich's objection was essentially the same as Hayek's: state welfare officials possessed discretionary power that undermined rule-oflaw protections that are the basis of individual liberty. Moreover, like
Hayek, Reich argued that conditional welfare threatens individual
freedom unequally:
Inequalities lie deep in the administrative structure of government largess.
The whole process of acquiring it and keeping it favors some applicants and
recipients over others. The administrative process is characterized by uncertainty, delay, and inordinate expense; to operate within it requires considerable know-how. All of these factors strongly favor larger, richer, more
72
experienced companies or individuals over smaller ones.

Reich's solution to the dilemma of government largess and the rule
of law was not to dismantle the welfare state but to add procedural
protections that would simultaneously strengthen its rule-of-law character and bolster the welfare state. The key was to treat government
largess as "property," and not simply as wealth. Reich's argument for
bestowing the legal status of property on government-derived wealth
was straightforwardly liberal. The central function of property, he argued, is to "draw a boundary between public and private power."7 3
Within the private sphere, "the majority has to yield to the owner."7 4
Political rights serve the same function, but political rights are dependent on property. Property rights are, as it were, "the guardian of
every other right."75
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1960).
See id. at 611-12.
Reich, supra note 58, at 769.
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 771.

74. Id.
75. ARTnu
BRITAIN,

LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE & INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT

N TMH PRESENT DISPUTES WITH AmERICA 25 (London, J. Almon 1774).
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Reich's category of government largess was broad and extremely
varied. Professional licenses, taxicab medallions, AFDC benefits, Social Security retirement benefits were all treated as one piece. Reich
did not distinguish between those interests, like AFDC, that the government granted strictly on the basis of need, and those that represented some form of social insurance, to which the beneficiary had
made lifetime contributions, the sort involved in Flemming v. Nestor.
From the perspective of their propertyness, the former was the far
more troublesome sort of government largess. The latter type of benefit, an example of which Efraim Nestor was deprived, was not truly
largesse. Social Security retirement benefits, like other forms of social
insurance, are easily squared with the classical liberal theory of the
legitimate means of acquiring property rights. They are a benefit acquired through one's labor; they are an entitlement precisely because
they are earned.7 6 Much more problematic is the true welfare benefit,
that is, the benefit that one receives from the government merely by
virtue of one's need. Treating benefits of this sort as property cannot
be reconciled with classical liberal theory, as Hayek saw. Reich's notable contribution was to revise the liberal theory of property in a way
that justified legal recognition of this form of government-derived
wealth, the true welfare benefit, as individually-owned property. Due
process, procedural and substantive, was Reich's primary tool for
transforming largess into property. Procedurally, he called for the familiar due process safeguards-notice, hearing and contest, judicial
review-for all government actions affecting largess. Substantively,
he suggested that largess should be regulated the same way that
traditional property is regulated, and that forfeiture should be used
only as the last resort:
The presumption should be that the professional man will keep his license,
and the welfare recipient his pension. These interests should be "vested." If
revocation is necessary, not by reason of the fault of the individual holder, but
by reason of overriding demands of public policy, perhaps payment of just
compensation would be appropriate. The individual should not bear the en77
tire loss for a remedy primarily intended to benefit the community.

Reich's theory bore fruit quickly but only temporarily. Welfare
rights lawyers, eager to find a doctrinal basis for securing their clients'
vulnerable interests against government threats, drew on Reich's pro78
posals in litigation involving welfare suspensions and terminations.
76. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
L. REv. 1, 25 (1985).
77. Reich, supra note 58, at 785.
78. See MARTHA F. DAvIs, BRUTAL NEED: LAwYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 86 (1993).
Reich was not the only legal scholar whose ideas influenced welfare rights
lawyers. They drew on ideas developed in articles by Jacobus TenBroek, Joel
Handler, and others. One whose influence on advocacy lawyers was as least as
great as Reich's, if not more so, was Edward V. Sparer, dubbed by some the "wel-
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Measured in terms of doctrinal change, the welfare lawyers' efforts-and the ideas of Reich and Sparer-were rapidly but only temporarily successful. Between 1968 and 1970, the Court decided in
their favor in three major decisions. 7 9 The Court in one of these,
Goldberg v. Kelly,8 0 held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause requires that a welfare recipient be given a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. Speaking through Justice Brennan, the Court explicitly acknowledged the propertyness of welfare benefits, stating
that "[sluch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them."81 Citing Reich, Justice Brennan endorsed
his "new property" thesis: "It may be realistic today to regard welfare
entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights 82that do not fall
within traditional common-law concepts of property."
Justice Brennan also stated, "Public assistance, then, is not mere
charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'"8 3 Brennan's
opinion, however, said nothing which indicated that the Court was
84
prepared to recognize a substantive right to welfare.
The victory in Goldberg was short-lived. In the early 1970s many
states restructured public assistance programs like AFDC in ways
that not only tightened eligibility standards but also made the process

79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

fare law guru." See id. at 22. Sparer, the founder and director of several influential public interest law firms, including Mobilization for Youth Legal Services, the
Columbia University Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, and the Health
Law Project at the University of Pennsylvania, was one of the leaders of the welfare rights social movement, first as an activist lawyer and later as an academic.
His overriding objective was to gain legal recognition of a constitutional "right to
live," which basically translated into a guaranteed minimum income. While
many of his ideas were consistent with Reich's approach, his right-to-live theory
went substantially beyond the strategy of formalizing the legal protection of entitlements and was far more controversial. The lawyers who argued the case
before the Supreme Court compromised the dispute over which theory to press by
offering watered-down versions of both. The basic point they pushed was that
welfare benefits were entitlements, a form of property protected by certain
mandatory procedural requirements, including a right to a prior hearing. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). For a recent and excellent overview of
these cases and the Reichian new property thesis, see Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and Reform": ProceduralDue Processand the New Welfare
Act, 50 ADmN. L. REv. 591 (1998).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263 n.8.
Id. at 265.
Indeed, an earlier draft of Brennan's opinion explicitly put that question aside.
See DAVIs, supra note 78, at 113.
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of determining eligibility vastly more bureaucratic and impersonal.s 5
The responsibility for supplying proof to establish initial and continuing eligibility was shifted from caseworkers to recipients, and the
character of required proof became more complex and technical.
Moreover, the frontline administrative personnel with whom recipients had to deal for financial assistance matters changed from professionally-trained social workers to non-professional "eligibility
technician [s]."86 The combined effect of these changes, along with
large federal budget cuts, was, as Sparer put it, "to cut welfare grant
levels and remove eligibility for major groups of poor people."S7
D.

The Dilemma of the New Property and
Property-as-Propriety

On the surface, Reich's theory seems to reflect a commodity understanding of property rather than the propriety conception. Explicitly
individualist in its premises, the theory lends itself to being interpreted in terms of what Frank Michelman has called the "possessive
conception" of constitutional property rights.88 By that, Michelman
means the idea that property is a negative claim that the owner has
against others, including the state, not to interfere with her use, possession, and enjoyment of her property. Most immediately, the claim
includes the right to be free from redistributive actions by the state
that take away any portion of one's interest in her property. The possessive conception captures the core of the classical liberal understanding of property that is often attributed to Locke and which C.B.
8 9
Macpherson labeled "possessive individualism."
Reich's theory had one foot at least tentatively planted in that tradition. As others have noted, 90 his premises were starkly individualist, and the theory stressed the need to protect the right of possession
of assets that fell into the new category of property he had identified.
Moreover, as William Simon has pointed out, the "new property" theory had anti-redistributive implications that posed a dilemma that
85. See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System,
92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-06 (1983).
86. Id. at 1215.
87. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social
Struggle: A Friendly Critiqueof the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 509, 561-62 (1984).
88. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of
Property, 72 IowA L. REv. 1319, 1319 (1987).
89. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIvE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LocKE 263-77 (1962).
90. See, e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, Social Duties and the Problem of Rights in the
American Welfare State, in THE POLrrIcs OF LAW; A PROGRESSrVE CRITIQUE 90,
103 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
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Reich apparently did not recognize. 9 1 While the theory was intended
to support the redistributive programs of the welfare state, it in fact
undermines their legitimacy. By urging that the old and new property
be treated alike, both vested and both entitled to just compensation for
any government-induced impairment, Reich unintentionally made it
impossible for the state to fund the new property. As Simon succinctly
put it, "If all wealth is to be regarded as 'vested,' then there can be no
coercive redistribution."92 Redistributing wealth to provide welfare
benefits for some inevitably requires that the state interfere with the
putatively vested property rights of others.
However much Reich's rhetoric may have resembled Michelman's
possessive conception of constitutional property, the theory's fundamental thrust was in a very different direction, a direction much
closer to a non-commodified, civic understanding of property. The fact
that Reich's theory was intended to legitimate the redistributive activities of the welfare state itself puts considerable distance between it
and the classical liberal outlook on property. The tenets of classical
liberalism require, as Hayek saw, not only that property always be
available for market exchange but that any transfers of property from
one person or group to another occur only through the mechanism of
the market. While Reich shared Hayek's concern with the fragile status of individual liberty in the modern state, he clearly did not accept
Hayek's commitment to the market as the central mechanism for protecting liberty. More importantly, Reich's purpose in seeking protection of the new property was not the economic goal of encouraging the
accumulation of wealth. His central concern was with politics, not the
market.
The new property was the currency of the civic realm for welfare
rights advocates. Toward the end of his article, Reich focused on benefits like old-age insurance, unemployment compensation, and public
assistance as especially needful of protection. He explained the function of these benefits in overtly civic terms. Their purpose, he stated,
is to preserve the self-sufficiency of the individual, to rehabilitate him where
necessary, and to allow him to be a valuable member of a family and a community; in theory they represent part of the individual's rightful share in the
commonwealth. Only by making such benefits into rights can the welfare
state achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum basis for individual well91. See Simon, supra note 76, at 31-33. Simon elsewhere speculates, plausibly
enough, that Reich failed to consider the distributive aspects of his theory because the inflationary public finance policies that characterized the time at which
he wrote his articles obscured the redistributive consequences of welfare. The
redistributive effects became apparent later, in the late 1970s-the "zero-sum"
society rather than the Great Society-when welfare programs were financed
through taxation. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistributionin the Welfare System, 38 SrAN. L. Rsv. 1431, 1488 (1986).
92. Simon, supra note 76, at 31.
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being and dignity
in a society where each man cannot be wholly the master of
93
his destiny.

Reich here was restating the familiar American civic argument that
good citizenship requires that individuals sometimes sacrifice their
private interests for the well-being of the community. 94 A part of that
obligation was to provide for the needs of others who were struck by
ill-fortune, for the calamities of some were calamities of the entire
community.95 The welfare state is simply a mechanism for fulfilling
that collective responsibility.
Within this framework, the role of the new property, as well as for
the old, is to satisfy individuals' needs-not necessarily their wantsso that they can contribute to the commonwealth as independent citizens. Welfare as property, in this sense, is no different than the "forty
acres and a mule" that Thaddeus Stevens proposed be redistributed to
the newly-freed slaves during the Reconstruction era. 9 6 Reich's background principle was the same as Stevens': in the face of a large class
of propertyless citizens, the preservation of the social order requires a
scheme of wealth redistribution that confers on all citizens the minimum entitlements necessary for individual self-governance.
Recent commentators have renewed this call for a constitutional
scheme of minimum entitlements, drawing support from Reich. Akhil
Amar, for example, has argued that section two of the Thirteenth
Amendment, properly read, requires such a scheme. 97 That Amendment's original intent, he contends, was to guarantee every American
citizen a minimum stake in society in order to free all Americans of
the economic dependence that corrodes citizenship. For Amar, as for
Reich, the objective is not equality but individual freedom. In Amar's
words, "the notion of minimal entitlements is not a notion that everyone should have an equal amount of property.... It is not an argument that equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment means
equal property, but rather that freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment implies a notion of some minimal entitlement."98
While Reich thought that freedom could be secured primarily
through procedural means, Amar, with the benefit of twenty-five
93. Reich, supra note 58, at 785-86 (footnote omitted).
94. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
68 (1969).
95. See id. at 69.
96. See ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 128-49
(1980).
97. See Akhil Reed Amar, Republicanism and Minimal Entitlements: Of Safety
Valves and the Safety Net, GEO. MASON UNIv. L. REv., Winter 1988, at 47, 49;
Akhil Reed Amar, FortyAcres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 IARv. J. OF LAw & PUB. PoL'Y 37, 39 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Forty
Acres and a Mule].
98. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule, supra note 97, at 41.
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years' hindsight on the failures of the "new property," realizes that the
vision of independence for all citizens require substantive guarantees.
However, the same dilemma confronts both strategies: How is economic independence secured when the source of entitlements, substantive or procedural, is the state? The development of welfare
entitlements as a system of civic property seems as perverse as Hayek
thought welfare was for market property. Both the market and civic
property systems require individual autonomy (though for quite different reasons), yet welfare entitlements create a social subsystem of direct dependency and hierarchy. The very idea of welfare as property,
in this sense, seems self-contradictory.
Amar is acutely aware of the dilemma. This is why he takes pains
to distinguish the scheme of minimal entitlements he attributes to the
Thirteenth Amendment-forty acres and a mule-from welfare:
[F]orty acres and a mule is not a dole. It is not welfare. It is much more like
workfare. Forty acres and a mule do not yield a harvest without labor, and in
the process of laboring, a citizen can gain self-respect and the respect of
others. We must remember that our goal is to create independent citizens.
Ironically, many current welfare programs may have moved us away from
that goal by perpetuating cycles of dependency. By contrast, the kind of education and job-training programs I am advocating here are designed to promote self-sufficiency and reward hard work. 9 9

Perhaps education and job-training are sufficient responses to the
problem of dependency for some welfare recipients, but surely not for
all. Some classes of dependents are dependent for reasons that have
nothing to do with lack of job skills. To the extent that citizenship
requires self-governance, what form of property, what alternative to
the Reichian scheme of welfare-as-property might be adequate?
This is not the appropriate occasion to answer that question.OO
Two points, however, need to be made to clarify what the question
involves. First, the modern civic conception of property builds on the
Progressive-realist insight that no legal property regime can create
99. Id. at 42.
There is, of course, another way of looking at the whole question. A very different cultural outlook on welfare, citizenship, and self-sufficiency is suggested by
the following exchange from Barbara Kingsolver's wonderful novel, Pigs in
Heaven. The speaker is Annawake Fourkiller, a Cherokee lawyer living on a reservation in Oklahoma:
"One time in law school we were discussing the concept of so-called irresponsible dependents. That a ward of society can't be a true citizen. I
wanted to stand up and tell the class about Boma and the bottle tree
[Boma is, as Annawake describes her, 'the town lunatic.l. That there's
another way of looking at it."
"What's that?"
"Just that you could love your crazy people, even admire them, instead of
resenting that they're not self-sufficient."
BARBARA KINGSOLVER, PIGS IN HEAVEN 231 (1993).
100. For a recent and imaginative attempt to answer that question, see BRucE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
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complete individual freedom from state power. Even in the minimal
night-watchman state, private property rights derive from the state as
delegated sovereignty. The state logically can and historically sometimes has altered its delegation of sovereignty. The upshot is that the
personal security that classical property rights in fact create is inevitably contingent. Ultimately, no property system can eliminate the
possibility of state intervention. The real issues are, which exercises
of state power against property interests are legitimate and by what
criteria is legitimacy determined.
The second point is that the notion of individual independence has
a different meaning from the civic perspective than it has in classical
liberal thought. In classical liberalism, the core meaning of independence, signified by property rights, is personal security against unwanted interference by others, most especially the state. From the
civic perspective, personal independence means not security against
material losses, that is, losses of commodities viewed as instruments
for satisfying individual preferences, but against political-ethical loss,
that is, loss of the self-respect that is the basis for proper citizenship
and, ultimately, the proper social order.
Neither of these points resolves or evades the dilemma of independence in the welfare state for the civic conception. In recent years, a
number of legal scholars, attempting to develop an explicitly civic understanding of property, have directly acknowledged that dilemma.'O'
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to describe the dilemma of independence
as the central predicament facing the civic conception of property in
late twentieth-century legal discourse. Whether or not the recent responses have been successful at pointing the way past the dilemma,
they have underscored the continuing dialectic of property in American legal thought.
IV.

THE TWITCHING CORPSE OF PROPRIETY

If I am right that the idea of property as the foundation of propriety has in the past exerted a significant, and at times major, influence
on legal thought and legal doctrine, then the question becomes, what
happened to that idea? No one today seems to have heard of it, so
what led to its apparent demise?
The balance of this Paper provides some evidence indicating that
the proprietarian conception in fact is not dead. Both legal theory and
legal doctrine are filled with examples of property norms that are best
101. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the ModernI
Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999 (1988);
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Frank I. Michelman,
Republican Property (1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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understood as resting on the views that the preference-satisfying, or
commodity, function of property at times threatens the well-ordered
society and that in such situations, wealth-maximization must be
subordinated to the non-economic interests at stake.
In one sense it should hardly be surprising that propriety-maintaining considerations still exert considerable influence in our property law system. There are many instances in our legal property
system of what Calabresi and Melamed called "inalienability
rules."1o2 Some of these have been the subject of heated debates in
which the conflict of moral and social visions is explicit; others are
much more prosaic. Obviously those that have been defended in terms
of social morality reflect the continuing appeal of proprietarian ideas.
The controversy over Judge Posner's proposal to legalize baby-selling provides a clear example of these inalienability rules or, what
Michael Walzer calls "blocked exchanges"1OS and Margaret Jane Radin calls "market-decommodification."1o 4 The more sophisticated arguments made against his proposal articulated a normative
conception of the moral society and then explained from the perspective of that conception why the extension of the market to humans
would constitute an "impropriety" of the grossest sort. To these critics, Judge Posner's responses to objections seemed question-begging
precisely because they presupposed a social order that the critics
found morally repugnant. It is completely beside the point that babyselling might increase social wealth, the critics in effect said. There
are just some things that a proper society does not submit to market
5
forces.1O
The legal prohibition of baby-selling is only one example of an inalienability rule that is best explained as based on the conception of
property as the foundation of the proper social order. Many of the
most controversial instances of market-inalienability (and alienable
commodities that some people would like to decommodify-consider
the case of pornography) are controversial precisely because they implicate strongly-held views about just what the properly-ordered society is.
But not all instances of property rules resting on a concern with
maintaining the proper social order rather than maximizing prefer102. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
103. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALrrY
100-103 (1983).
104. See generally MARGARET JANE RADn, CONTESTED COVIhODmIES (1996).
105. This is not to say that all controversies over proposals to extend the reach of
market exchange are controversial because they deviate from widely-shared visions of social propriety. Some people may object to commodifying a particular
asset on the basis of their belief that doing so would not maximize preferencesatisfaction in the aggregate.
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ence-satisfaction are quite so controversial. Consider the case of historic preservation law.
One of the more controversial questions in modern land-use regulation is the role of aesthetic values. Until quite recently, courts seldom sustained aesthetic zoning measures, such as local regulations
requiring approval of building plans by a city architectural board, on
the basis of their aesthetic purposes alone. Where such measures
were sustained, the courts usually cited protection of property values
as the primary reason.1 0 6 Despite the fact that, analytically, the de07
cline in market value must be epiphenomenal rather than primary,3
courts rarely admitted that protection of aesthetic values was itself a
sufficient basis for regulation. The reasons are obvious. Aesthetic values, many believe, are inherently subjective (even if moral values are
not), so that any regulation of land use on that basis will be arbitrary
and subject to familiar regulatory abuses. There is evidence in the
case law that this judicial attitude has relaxed somewhat in recent
years,1 0 8 but zoning for purely aesthetic reasons remains
controversial.1 0 9
By contrast, courts have been much more strongly inclined to sustain historic zoning and historic preservation legislation. The distinction between "purely" aesthetic zoning and historic preservation may
seem clear enough in the context of older cases such as United States
v. Gettysburg ElectricRailway Company,110 in which the question was
whether condemnation of land for the creation of a national battlefield
memorial at Gettysburg served a "public purpose."' 1 But preservation for the sake of architectural merit alone, without reference to particular historical events or personalities, blurs the line between
"aesthetic" regulation and "historic" regulation. Why, then, have
courts been much less reluctant to sustain the latter?
Several possible explanations might be offered, but one basis for
distinguishing between the two forms of regulation that has been particularly prominent is the very propriety-sounding idea that architecture has a political role. It both creates and expresses some
substantive vision of how the political order of its society should be
constituted. Now, that idea can and has been used to defend radically
different images of the proper social order, ranging from Albert
Speer's National Socialist plans to neighborhood preservation efforts
106. See State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. 1970).
107. See Frank Michelman, Toward a PracticalStandardfor Aesthetic Regulation, 15
PRAc. LAw. 36, 37 (1969).
108. See State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982).
109. See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852 (Ohio 1984)(acknowledging aesthetic reasons, but sustaining local zoning measure primarily on
the basis of protecting market value).
110. 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
111. See id. at 679.
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by groups like Washington, D.C.'s Don't Tear It Down. More recently,
American preservation law has been shaped by the idea that "[a] major public purpose underlying [historic] preservation law is the fostering of [local] community cohesion, and ultimately, the encouragement
of pluralism."'112 It is precisely the fact that preservation law is seen
as constitutive of the social order that has led courts to be more sympathetic to the argument that collective deliberation, rather than market transactions alone, should be the basis for such land-use decisions.
A final example of the continuing vitality of the propriety function
of property is takings law. Without getting too deeply into the details
of takings law, suffice it to say that the widely-shared perception is
that the state of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence today is a
mess.1 15 I don't purport to be able to reconcile all of the Court's recent
cases, but I do think that some of the more controversial decisions can
be understood as implicitly premised on what I have called a
proprietarian conception. The well-known Penn Central case 114 provides an example. That case involved a constitutional challenge to the
decision of the New York City Landmark Preservation Commission
denying the owners of Grand Central Terminal (which had previously
been designated a landmark) permission to construct a 55-story office
structure on top of the original Terminal building. The Supreme
Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the Commission's decision did not
effect an unconstitutional taking of property.'1 5 One of the arguments
that the Terminal's owners had emphasized was that they had been
unfairly singled out. The Landmark Preservation law is unlike zoning
of historic district laws in the sense that it does not impose the same
restrictions on all structures within a particular physical area. Conceding that this means that the law had a more severe impact on some
building owners than others, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, observed that "[1legislation designed to promote the general wel11 6
fare commonly burdens some [people] more than others."
Expanding on that point, he indicated that the preservation law was
reasonably designed to implement a policy expected to produce "a
widespread public benefit." That public benefit was the recognition
and protection for the public of "sensibilities and ideals reflected in
landmark legislation like New York City's."117 It doesn't seem hard to
figure out that from Justice Brennan's point of view, landmark
designation does not rest on subjective taste. It may be true that de
112. Carol M. Rose, Preservationand Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation,33 STAN. L. REv. 473, 533 (1981).
113. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
114. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
115. See id. at 138.
116. Id. at 133.
117. Id. at 134 n.30.
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gustibus non est disputandum, but that is quite beside the point. The
point is that buildings like Grand Central serve civic functions, and
those functions are too important to be left to the vagaries of the
market.
Now, one obvious response to this view is confession-and-avoidance. Let's assume for the sake of argument that buildings like Grand
Central do perform such functions and that it is uncertain whether or
not the market would adequately recognize them. That only justifies
the use of eminent domain, not uncompensated regulation. That response fails to recognize (or more likely, to concede) the proprietarian
premise. The premise implicit in Justice Brennan's reasoning is just
that citizens may legitimately be required to bear private sacrifices in
the interest of creating and maintaining the healthy social order, that
is, propriety.
But, the skeptic wants to ask, how does Justice Brennan or anyone
else for that matter know what constitutes the healthy social order,
especially in relation to matters as subjective as architecture? Obviously, I can't fully answer that on behalf of Justice Brennan, but his
opinion does provide some possible clues. It is not insignificant, I
think, that he talks about the need to recognize "the development in
sensibilities and ideals reflected in landmark legislation like New
York City's."118 The sensibilities and ideals that constitute the proper
social order are neither immanent nor immediately apparent. They
"develop." Moreover, they are "reflected" in legislation. Conceding the
familiar flaws in the political process that public-choice theory has
emphasized, it still remains, Justice Brennan might have said, the
case that politics is a deliberative process, and public deliberation is
the basis of democratic legitimacy of such judgments." 9
This is, obviously, a very incomplete answer, and it certainly does
not respond to all the objections that might be raised to cases like
Penn Central, let alone to the proprietarian tradition tout court. The
objective of this paper is less to defend the proprietarian conception of
property than to establish its influence in legal thought, past and
present.
Perhaps the most important implication of the rediscovery of a
property tradition that has competed in American legal thought with
the commodity idea is to undermine claims that history privileges one
conception among all others. History provides no conversation-stoppers in debates over property. Every conception of property is contestable and must be defended on its own merits. Propriety requires that
we at least acknowledge that there's no easy way out.
118. Id.
119. Cf. JURGEN
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